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Abstract  
 
This paper is the first to highlight that the stock-ADR arbitrage pair trading found by 
(Alsayed and McGroarty, 2012) is directly influenced by the market microstructure of ADRs.  
In (Alsayed and McGroarty, 2012) they are the first to demonstrate that arbitrage opportunities 
exist  between stocks and their ADRs, through convergence pairs trading. Given that such 
arbitrage opportunities exist, we pose the question as to why such pair trades occur, rather than 
be eliminated by the law of one price? Using high frequency data over a 3 year sample period, 
with over 3.7 million 1-minute observations, we investigate stock-ADR arbitrage pair trading.  
In this paper, we find pair trading returns exhibit substantial asymmetry in returns: pair 
trades involving ADR shorts (compared to stock shorts) have significantly less probability of 
loss, substantially higher returns but higher convergence risk. The asymmetric results are 
consistent with the market microstructure of ADR trading, specifically the sourcing of ADRs. 
Whilst long and short stocks can be easily sourced from the relevant markets, long and short 
ADR sourcing is less viable due to the market microstructure, but also, ADR’s microstructure 
directly impacts the stock’s price. We test our microstructure hypothesis further for robustness, 
with respect to specific investor types (such as retail  traders), as well as during different market 
conditions (before, during and after the commencement of the global financial crisis), and find 
our results are consistent with our ADR  microstructure hypothesis. This is also supported by 
CFD (contracts for difference) and ADR pairs trading results. Our results also confirm the 
results of (Alsayed and McGroarty, 2012) by conducting trades over a substantially longer and 
more varied trading period. Our results have implications for ADR markets, as well as market 
microstructures upon financial innovations such as exchange traded funds. 
 
  
1. Introduction  
  An ADR is a security that represents shares in a non-US company but with the added 
convenience of trading as a typical US share (and denominated in US dollars). The ADRs 
therefore provide a convenient method for US investors to effectively trade foreign shares on 
their domestic US exchanges, internationally diversify their holdings but also to circumvent 
foreign tax, regulatory and other legal issues relating to foreign investors.  By the principle of 
no arbitrage, given that the ADRs and stocks are bilaterally convertible then both securities 
must trade at parity (after adjusting for any trading costs and exchange rate conversions). 
However, it has been observed that stocks and ADRs do not trade at parity (see for instance 
(Bin et al., 2003) and (Dey and Wang, 2012)) consequently there are arbitrage opportunities. 
The UK stock market generates one of the highest interests in foreign investors 
compared to other international markets around the world. In (Alsayed and McGroarty, 2012) 
they were the first to discover that arbitrage opportunities occur between UK stocks and their 
associated ADRs, through a convergence pair trading approach. This involved awaiting for 
stock and ADR prices to diverge sufficiently from parity (after taking into account various 
trading costs and exchange rate conversions), and then taking long and short positions in the 2 
assets in the anticipation that both assets would converge back to parity. 
 In (Alsayed and McGroarty, 2012) they discovered small and frequent arbitrage 
opportunities occur and the dynamics of the stock-ADR pair trading arbitrage are investigated 
(such as mean reversion and trade duration), however the fundamental question as to the cause 
of such pair trades occurring was not investigated. Moreover, much literature has concluded 
that stock-ADR markets are auto-efficient and arbitrage opportunities are non-existent, since 
trading costs are too prohibitive for investors to capitalise upon price discrepancies. 
Furthermore, the current literature on stock-ADR arbitrage typically investigates arbitrage 
without reference to a pairs trading approach, rather the ‘direct arbitrage’ approach is 
investigated.  
Within the financial literature, market microstructure has typically received little 
attention, since its impact has been previously considered negligible. However, market 
microstructure has recently gained increasing attention with problems cited in the ETF 
(exchange traded fund) market being directly related to market microstructure issues. 
Consequently, such recent findings have prompted researchers to investigate market 
microstructure. With this in mind, we investigate the market microstructure of the stock-ADR 
market. 
Using 3 years of intraday data from January 1, 2007-December 31, 2009 we investigate 
stock-ADR pairs trading and makes a number of contributions. Firstly,  this is the first paper 
to highlight that the stock-ADR arbitrage pair trading is asymmetric: in a stock-ADR 
convergence pair trade the profitability and risk is significantly dependent upon shorting the 
stock (and going long on the ADR), or  shorting the ADR (and going long on the stock).  
Secondly, we show that our results are consistent with the market microstructure hypothesis of 
ADR trading impacting returns. In particular, the sourcing of long and short stocks is readily 
available with large and active markets, however sourcing long and short ADR trades is less 
feasible due to the market microstructure. The ADR’s microstructure directly impacts the 
stock’s price, thereby impacting the pair trade convergence in an asymmetric way. 
Thirdly, this paper employs data taken on 1-minute price intervals for UK stock and 
ADR prices. In total, our dataset consists of 3.7 million observations of company stock and 
ADR prices. This includes the 20 most liquid and largest UK companies by market 
capitalisation. We also incorporate transaction and other trading costs in our dataset, such as 
taxes and conversion costs, and these are taken from real market data (such as market brokers). 
To the best of our knowledge, we employ the longest period of empirical high-frequency data 
in the extant literature (in (Alsayed and McGroarty, 2012) the data period is only 4 months). 
This study does not only provide a more thorough empirical analysis at high frequency 
intervals, but also allows us to investigate aspects of the whole market activity more 
thoroughly, such as market participants, the market structure and the price discovery process. 
Finally, for robustness we test our hypothesis further by conducting pair trades with respect to 
specific market conditions and particular investors. We find our results are consistent with the 
ADR microstructure hypothesis. The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 reviews 
the current literature, section 3 describes the data and methodology, section 4 presents the main 
empirical results, section 5 presents the analysis, and section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Related Literature  
The bank JP Morgan was the first to create ADRs as a means for US investors to trade 
foreign shares in a more a convenient way. The ADRs trade like conventional US shares and 
are virtually identical to their underlying stock, providing ownership of the non-US company.  
Given that ADRs and the underlying non-US stock have bilateral convertibility, the principle 
of no arbitrage implies that both assets should trade at parity, even after including currency 
conversions and trading related costs e.g. taxes, broker and market exchange fees. 
A major body of stock-ADR research has been dedicated to international price 
discovery of an essentially cross-listed asset. In (Gagnon and Karolyi, 2010) propose that ADR 
premiums and discounts are dependent on economic development in the underlying share’s 
country; that is the lower the development then the higher the price disparity. In (Howe and 
Ragan, 2002) conclude that price discovery is led in the home market and then followed by the 
ADR, rather than the reverse. In (Kim et al., 2000) they examine the speed of adjustment 
between stock and ADR prices and their relation to market factors; they find that adjustment is 
related to the market index, exchange rates and the price of the underlying share. In  (Grammig 
et al., 2005) they examine German stock-ADR pairs and suggest that most of the price 
discovery occurs in the home market. In related price discovery literature (although not 
exclusively with regards to ADRs), in (Eun and Sabherwal, 2003) show that for dual listed 
stocks in the USA and Canada, that price discovery is directly related to the competition for 
order flow.  
A second area of stock-ADR research relates to practical factors that prevent ADR and 
stocks from achieving parity in actual markets, such as regulatory constraints and capital 
controls. In (Grossman et al., 2007) they investigate 74 stocks and their respective ADRs from 
nine different countries. They conclude that stock-ADR price parity is inhibited by transaction 
costs and high T-bill rates. In (Liu, 2007) it analyses Japanese stocks and their ADRs, 
concluding that the pricing behaviour of stocks and ADRs differ with respect to autocorrelation, 
so that price discrepancies exist between the two securities. Also (Liu, 2007) accounts for the 
variations due to changes in tax laws and transaction costs.  In (Callahan and Barry, 2003), 
(Silva and Chavez, 2008) and (Levy et al., 2009) also find similar conclusions in terms of 
trading costs and market frictions. In (Kadapakkam et al., 2010) they observe significant price 
discrepancies between Hong Kong stocks and their ADRs; they associate this with differences 
in cashflow timings due to dividends. Heterogeneous preferences have also been cited as 
reasons for price discrepancies in the stock-ADR market (see for instance (Hsu and Wang , 
2008) and  (Chen et al., 2009)). 
The third major strand of stock-ADR research has focused  on the restoration process 
of price parity between ADRs and the underlying stock, specifically through the principle of 
arbitrage. It is this area of research to which our paper contributes. The extant literature 
typically focuses on price parity being enforced through the ‘direct conversion’ method, 
whereby a depository bank running an ADR schemes directly converts a stock into an ADR 
(or vice versa). This attracts conversion and associated taxes (to be discussed later)  and using 
the direct conversion method, papers such as (Wahab and Lashgari, 1992), (Park and Tavakkol 
,1994) and (Kato et al., 1991) claim arbitrage opportunities do not exist. However, such papers  
have typically used daily closing price data, thus price discrepancies on an intra-day basis 
would not be detected.  In (Suarez, 2005) 12 French stocks and their ADRs are investigated 
using high frequency data and concludes that arbitrage opportunities exist. 
In (Alsayed and McGroarty, 2012), using a high frequency dataset over a 4 month 
period, they are the first to highlight stock-ADR price parity enforcement using a convergence 
pairs trading approach, rather than the ‘direct conversion’ approach. The key research in 
convergence pairs trading was initiated by (Gatev et al., 2006), who applied the arbitrage 
trading method to stocks. In (Alsayed and McGroarty, 2012) they apply the same principle but 
to stocks and ADRs, and find small but frequent arbitrage opportunities exist (net of all trading 
costs). Additionally, in (Alsayed and McGroarty, 2012) they find stock-ADR pair traders face 
mean reverting dynamics and uncertainty regarding the duration of the trade until parity is 
achieved (fundamental risk). 
Whilst (Alsayed and McGroarty, 2012) examine the dynamics of stock-ADR pair 
trading and the profitability, the question as to the cause of such arbitrage opportunities is left 
open. Additionally, (Alsayed and McGroarty, 2012) is conducted over a 4 month period, and 
so it is not definite that the results also valid over a more substantial and varied trading period. 
This prompts us to investigate further the stock-ADR pair trading method discovered by 
(Alsayed and McGroarty, 2012),  over a longer and more varied trading period, specifically 
before, during and after the commencement of the global financial crisis. 
To the best of our knowledge there is no literature on stock-ADR pair trading arbitrage 
and market microstructure impacting returns. Given that microstructure has been recently cited 
as a key factor in determining the performance of ‘derivative’ securities such as ETFs, one 
would logically posit that such that factors also influence the performance of ADRs. In fact 
whilst the short and long market is well serviced for UK equities, this is not necessarily true 
for ADRs. Moreover, the shorting and long buying processes of ADRs directly impact the UK 
equity market, whereas this does not occur for ADRs when one takes short or long positions in 
UK stocks. 
Market microstructure has been investigated by a number researchers; O’Hara has been 
a major contributor to this area (O’Hara, 1995) and it has an acknowledged impact on trading 
returns in markets (see for instance  (Easley and O’Hara, 2010)). The prominence of market 
microstructure has gained importance due to its impact on ETF and its underlying products. 
For example in (Krause et al., 2014) demonstrate that ETF volatility directly impact the 
volatility of their underlying assets, rather than tracking the underlying assets. This is directly 
related to microstructure of ETFs, which must trade the underlying stocks (similar to the trading 
of  ADRs). 
 
 
3. Methodology and Data  
In this section we explain the method and data used in our stock-ADR pairs trading 
method. We follow the approach of (Alsayed and McGroarty, 2012) but use high frequency 
data at 1-minute trading intervals for stock and ADR prices, for 20 different UK companies, 
and over a 3 year period (from January 1, 2007 - December 31, 2009).  
 
3.1 Stock-ADR Arbitrage Pairs Trading  
Pairs trading involves entering simultaneous long and short positions, in a pair of 
relatively mispriced securities, then liquidating the positions upon price convergence (see for 
example (Gatev et al., 2006)). To calculate the mispricing in the stock-ADR pair, firstly we 
multiply the UK stock price by the ADR ratio (as shown in Table 1, the ADR ratio gives the 
number of UK shares that are equivalent to one ADR for each company) and then convert it to 
its US dollar price using the current spot exchange rate. This gives two dollar denominated 
time series: one ADR time series and one UK stock based time series (in dollar currency and 
converted by the ADR ratio). We then determine the UK stock premium or discount relative to 
the ADR using these two time series, and express the result in basis points (bp). 
An example of the stock premium or discount that is obtained for British American 
Tobacco’s mispricing is given in Figure 1. The x-axis denotes time, specifically 92,460 minute-
by-minute observations spanning the entirety of our data period (January 1, 2007 - December 
31, 2009). The y-axis denotes the premium or discount of the stock relative to the ADR (in bp); 
positive values mean the stock is overpriced compared to the ADR (whereas negative values 
means underpricing). 
 
 
 
Figure 1: A graph of the mispricing process for British American Tobacco, with the y-axis for relative magnitude 
of mispricing (in basis points) and the x-axis denoting 1-minute time intervals (from January 3, 2007, 13.30 to 
December 31, 2009, 16.30). 
 
 
In order for an observed mispricing to qualify as a viable pairs trading opportunity, it 
must display a magnitude greater than that of the combined transaction costs incurred in 
executing a round trip trade (from opening to closing the entire position). To make clear this 
argument, we present a formal definition of viable mispricings, motivated by (Suarez, 2005). 
Let us denote the following: the UK stock bid and ask prices as Sbid and Sask respectively, the 
ADR bid and ask prices as Abid and Aask respectively, the spot GBP/USD exchange rate 
(number of dollars per British pound) bid and ask prices as FXbid and FXask respectively. We 
now define the viable mispricings M as: 
 
SbidFXbid-Aask, if Aask< SbidFXbid, 
M= Abid-SaskFXask, if Abid> SaskFXask,          (1) 
0, otherwise. 
 
It should be noted that in the context of equation (1), the bid and ask prices account for the 
entire structure of transaction costs, including exchange and brokers’ fees, the bid-ask spread, 
market impact costs, taxes, etc. Therefore the “bid” and “ask” in equation (1) are best 
interpreted qualitatively. 
We now explain equation (1): in the  first case the UK stock in dollar currency terms is 
more expensive than the ADR, so one can profit from this mispricing by shorting the UK stock 
{ 
at price Sbid and buying the ADR at price Aask. The pound proceeds of the UK stock short sale 
are immediately converted into dollars at the spot currency bid price FXbid ; this funds the 
purchase of ADR at price Aask. In the second case in equation (1), the UK stock in dollar 
currency terms is relatively cheaper than the ADR, so we short sell the ADR and go long on 
the stock. In the case where M = 0 the mispricing is unprofitable (even though the mispricing 
may be nonzero) and in this case the stock-ADR pairs are price efficient. 
We now algebraically formalize the pairs trading strategy. In the trading horizon T and 
time t is in 0 ≤ t ≤ T , the UK stock price St is converted into its dollar equivalent price by using 
the GBP/USD spot rate FXt. The ADR price at time t, denoted At, then allows us to calculate 
the relative stock-to-ADR mispricing, denoted by Rt, as follows: 
 
Rt=(StFXt-At)/At          (2) 
 
 We denote by Ft the level at which the UK stock trades at parity with the ADR. We 
propose that price parity in the stock-ADR pair does not occur at Rt = 0, but instead when the 
stock trades at a 25bp discount to the ADR. The reasoning behind this is as follows: assuming 
both UK and US investors have identical preferences and are indifferent towards owning a 
stock or an ADR, they will only trade at the cheaper location. Therefore in order for investors 
to buy UK stocks instead of ADRs, the UK stock will have to trade at 50bp or more below its 
ADR price to overcome the cost of Stamp Duty Reserve Tax (to be explained in proceeeding 
sections). Hence, we take this parity point to be Ft = 25bp (note: this is an argument based on 
economic fundamentals. Other values for Ft can be assumed, which make the trading exercise 
more profitable, but we do not pursue this in view of data snooping concerns). We denote 
Ct
LONG as the total round-trip cost of a pairs trade if the UK stock is relatively underpriced, 
whereas Ct
SHORT denotes the total round trip pair trade cost if the UK stock is relatively 
overpriced. 
 As with any pairs trading strategy, we must specify the entry bounds, that is the level 
of mispricing at which a pairs trading is initiated, and the exit bounds, that is the signals 
required to liquidate the entire pair trade position. There are various methods to specify these 
bounds, for example, (Gatev et al., 2006) follow a statistical approach: entry is signalled by 
spreads widening by greater than two-standard deviations from a historical mean, while exit is 
signalled when the mispricing returns to its historical mean. We base our entry/exit bounds 
consistent with (De Jong et al. , 2009) which is based on economic fundamentals, as this has 
the added advantage of not requiring a historical “training” period to generate trading signals. 
The arbitrageur enters a pairs-trade only if there exists a mispricing sufficiently wide enough 
to compensate for trading costs, and exits this position when the mispricing is within 10bp of 
the fair value Ft. Hence the exit bound Et = 10bp (the value of 10bp is chosen following similar 
arguments to (Gatev et al., 2006) and (De Jong et al.,  2009)). 
If Wt is the arbitrageur’s wealth at time t in US dollars, then we denote the arbitrageur’s 
opening position in the stock at time t as Nt
stock as follows: 
 
 
 
  
Nt
stock=      (3) 
 
 
 
 
Similarly, the arbitrageur’s open position in the ADR, NtADR is as follows: 
 
 
 
  
Nt
ADR=      (4) 
 
 
 
 
 
We note in passing that the arbitrageur will allocate half his capital to going long the 
underpriced (or cheap) security, and half going short the overpriced (or expensive) security. 
The position is exited when the relative mispricing falls below Et = 10bp of parity Ft, otherwise 
the position remains open. Formally, at each subsequent time-step (t, t + 1], the arbitrageur’s 
position in the stock satisfies: 
 
 
Nt+1
Stock =           (5) 
 
 
0.5Wt , if Rt<-Ft-Ct
LONG-Et 
StFXt, 
 
-0.5Wt , if Rt>Ft+Ct
SHORT+Et 
 StFXt, 
 
0, otherwise. 
{
0, if ||Rt+1-Ft+1||≤  Et+1, 
Nt
Stock, otherwise. 
-0.5Wt , if Rt<-Ft-Ct
LONG-Et 
 At 
 
0.5Wt , if Rt>Ft+Ct
SHORT+Et 
 At 
 
0, otherwise. 
{
{ 
and his position in the ADR satisfies: 
 
Nt+1
ADR=           (5) 
 
 
For the benefit of the reader an example of the relative mispricing process Rt is given 
in Figure 2 for Intercontinental Hotels (with the same axes labels as in Figure 1). The entry 
bounds are the outermost bands; within these bands mispricings are not profitable. The parity 
value Ft is the middle of the horizontal lines at -25bp, and this line is surrounded by 2 lines 
which denote the exit bound lines for Et. 
 
Figure 2: The No-Arbitrage Band. Graph of the mispricing process for Intercontinental Hotels for each 1-minute interval 
through the period January 3, 2007 at 13.30- December 31, 2009 at 16.30. The vertical axis denotes the relative 
mispricing Rt , the parity value Ft in black, the exit bounds Et in red, and the entry bounds in green. The horizontal axis 
contains 92,460 contemporaneous minute-by-minute observations. 
 
 
3.2 Data  
Our dataset consists of a comprehensive list of 19 UK stock-ADR pairs, all sampled for 
price and volume at the end of contemporaneous 1-minute trading intervals, through the period 
January 1, 2007 - December 31, 2009. This means 92,460 minute-by-minute observations 
spanning the entirety of our data period (January 1, 2007- December 31, 2009) per stock, 
leading to 1.85 million stock or ADR price observations (therefore 3.7 million observations in 
total in our sample). The 3 year time period does not only provides a more thorough empirical 
analysis at high frequency intervals compared to (Alsayed and McGroarty, 2012) (which has a 
data period of only 4 months), but also allows us to investigate the market structure and the 
0, if ||Rt+1-Ft+1||≤  Et+1, 
Nt
ADR, otherwise. 
{ 
market participants more thoroughly. Additionally the 3 year time period also means that this 
study is the longest period of study in the extant literature and without bias to particular 
seasonality in the year.  
The details of the stock-ADR pairs can be found in Table 1. Stock and ADR data were 
obtained from TickData (TickData (www.tickdata.com)).  The data is obtained after a 
proprietary filtering algorithm is applied by TickData, which is executed as part of the standard 
data cleaning process. This is necessary to clean the data sample from stocks and ADRs with 
sufficiently high levels of erroneous data that exist in raw data. Additionally, for the resultant 
data a daily window was chosen to match the period where both the London and New York 
markets were simultaneously open. Hence, each day in the sample contains either 120 or 180 
ADR and stock observations, corresponding to the 2 or 3-hour daily overlap period. 
The estimates of broker commissions were obtained from research published by 
Investment Technology Group (available at www.itg.com/news events/papers), a Canada-
based trade cost analysis firm, while estimates of exchange order-execution commissions were 
obtained from the London Stock Exchange and New York Stock Exchange websites. The 
GBP/USD exchange rate data for each data point was obtained from Olsen and Associates. 
The exchange trading fees are obtained from published reports on both the LSE and 
NYSE websites. Both exchanges frequently revise their cost structures, often switching from 
flat per-trade fees to variable tiered fees. At no point during our sample period do the costs 
exceed 1bp, hence we assume this figure conservatively. The cost of FX conversion is also 
assumed at 1bp, since 80% of currency quotes are inside this spread. 
To identify the list of prospective companies suitable for pairs trading, we listed all UK 
stocks trading as ordinary shares and with ADRs trading on the NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX. 
This process eliminates ADRs that are not traded on an exchange (only issued over-the-counter 
at the depository bank) hence they are unsuitable for pairs trading. This also minimises liquidity 
risk in our trades since ordinary shares are more liquid than preferred shares. 
With the universe of stock-ADR pairs short-listed, we exclude all pairs which did not 
exist during the full period January 1, 2007 - December 31, 2009. This is to ensure a uniform 
sample and date range (and to avoid extrapolation of returns in gaps of data). Finally we arrive 
at a list of 19 ADR-stock pairs constituting our sample. The sample size of 19 large market 
capitalisation companies, with high frequency data, over 3 years, provides a sufficient sample 
size for our study; many studies have datasets with significantly lower periods than 3 years and 
a shorter number of observations. For example, (Eun and Sabberwal, 2003) covers a six month 
period of intraday data. The number of companies cover a sufficiently large number (the Dow 
Jones Industrial Index consists of 30 stocks) and the set of companies spans a range of sectors, 
giving a diversified sample. 
 
 
 
Table 1. A table of our data sample giving the ADR ratio for each company. 
 
 
We compute daily bid-ask spreads for each stock and ADR using daily closing bid and 
ask prices, which are then applied as direct transaction costs to the trade-price data. The daily 
bid and ask prices for UK stocks were obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream, while daily 
bid and ask prices for ADRs were obtained from the CRSP database. The closing spreads are 
assumed constant throughout the trading day. This method of spreads is deliberately 
conservative, since it is well-known that bid-ask spreads are higher at the beginning and end 
of the trading day (see e.g. (McInish and Wood, 1992), and (Werner and Kleidon, 1996)). Table 
2 shows for each company and each ADR, the median, 5th and 95th percentiles of all computed 
bid-ask spreads. The median spreads of stock and ADR in Table 2 rarely differ by more than 
10bp. 
For the pairs trading strategy we assume the investor must be able to cover the short 
position at all times in cash, a requirement similar to (D’Avolio, 2002). Hence a short position 
immobilizes its value in the investor’s cash, in the same way a long position does.  
 
 
 
Table 2. The median, 5th and 95th percentiles of bid-ask spreads for each stock-ADR pair. 
 
 
As a simple example, consider two stocks that both trade at $50. If an investor has a $100 
capital base, the largest long/short portfolio that can be formed is 1 stock short and 1 stock 
long. This requirement is clearly more strict than the US Regulation T 50% margin requirement 
as described by (De Jong et al., 2009).  
For pairs trading we have four transactions in total: two to take a position in the 
mispricing, and two to unwind the position once price parity is restored. Therefore we incur 
costs of two full bid-ask spreads, plus associated commissions. In addition to the bid-ask spread 
costs we incorporate other trading costs, namely brokerage commissions, exchange trading 
fees, and applicable UK taxes. Table 3 presents a summary of these costs (in bp). 
 
 
Table 3. The UK stock and ADR transaction costs. 
 
Since The Finance Act (1986), the UK imposes a Stamp Duty Reserve Tax (SDRT) of 
0.5% on all physical share purchases over £1,000 in value, and all electronic stock purchases 
of any value (based on the Oxera (an economics consultancy) report “Stamp Duty: its Impact, 
and the Benefits of its Abolition” - May 2007 available at (www.oxera.com)). The selling of 
shares does not incur SDRT. 
For the (initial) pair trade results we will assume a proprietary trader or institutional 
investor, akin to the proprietary trading desks at financial institutions and hedge funds. These 
investors incurs bid-ask spreads, pay no brokerage commissions, and incur UK stamp duty on 
the purchase of UK stocks at a rate of 50bp of the value of the transaction. In the subsequent 
sections we will introduce other investors who will incur brokerage commissions and other 
costs.  We note that pairs trading positions are initiated at entry bounds sufficient to cover the 
costs of trading, then unwound when the level of mispricing falls within 10bp of parity Ft. 
 
 
  
 
4. Results  
In this section we present and discuss the results of our work. 
 
Table 1: Institutional Trader Results (Overall) 
Trade 
Type 
Returns (Basis Points) 
Percentage 
of Trades 
Losses 
No. of 
trades 
Std Dev 
Returns 
Std Dev 
of trade 
duration Trade Duration 
Mean Median Min Max    Mean Median Min Max 
1 
67.62 45.65 -253.97 833.21 0.55 1091 75.33 69.71 33.47 12.85 0.02 799.13 
2 
3.68 -17.79 -223.14 605.24 68.08 1152 68.01 54.76 21.24 6.35 0.02 768.98 
Avg 
35.65 13.93 -238.56 719.23 34.32 1121.5 71.67 62.24 27.36 9.60 0.02 784.06 
 
 
Table 2:Institutional Trader Type 1 Results (By Period) 
Period 
Returns (Basis Points) 
Percentage 
of Trades 
Losses 
No. of 
trades 
Std Dev 
Returns 
Std Dev 
of trade 
duration Trade Duration 
Mean Median Min Max    Mean Median Min Max 
Jan 2007-
May2007 63.54 52.55 19.67 279.25 0.00 
108 42.61 74.98 
49.63 19.58 0.07 345.85 
June2007-
Jan2009 70.66 45.20 -253.97 689.50 0.74 
672 83.59 78.87 
35.09 12.67 0.02 799.13 
Feb2009-
Dec 2009 62.46 42.94 10.04 833.21 0.00 
311 64.27 38.55 
24.35 12.77 0.02 318.57 
 
 
Table 3:Institutional Trader Type 2 Results (By Period) 
Period 
Returns (Basis Points) 
Percentage 
of Trades 
Losses 
No. of 
trades 
Std Dev 
Returns 
Std Dev 
of trade 
duratio
n Trade Duration 
Mean Median Min Max    Mean Median Min Max 
Jan 2007-
May2007 3.33 -6.09 -48.34 337.08 57.14 
 
98 
 
47.75 
 
55.71 
32.12 7.53 0.02 268.12 
June2007-
Jan2009 6.13 -18.85 -223.14 605.24 
70.45 
 
714 
 
78.13 
 
62.76 
22.45 6.35 0.02 768.98 
Feb2009-
Dec 2009 -1.38 -17.60 -59.79 246.22 
66.28 
 
340 
 
46.57 
 
30.61 
15.57 6.15 0.02 291.12 
 
  
 
Table 4: CFD Results (Overall) 
Trade 
Type 
Returns (Basis Points) 
Percentage 
of Trades 
Losses 
No. of 
trades 
Std Dev 
Returns 
Std Dev 
of trade 
duration Trade Duration 
Mean Median Min Max    Mean Median Min Max 
1 
75.52 53.00 -35.05 856.41 0.23 1325 71.88 66.40 31.70 12.82 0.02 799.13 
2 
8.47 -10.16 -199.94 706.37 64.87 1690 66.08 48.35 17.57 5.77 0.02 768.98 
Avg 
42.00 21.42 -117.50 781.39 32.55 1507.5 68.98 57.38 24.63 9.29 0.02 784.06 
 
 
Table 5: CFD Type 1 Results (By Period) 
Period 
Returns (Basis Points) 
Percentage 
of Trades 
Losses 
No. of 
trades 
Std Dev 
Returns 
Std Dev 
of trade 
duration Trade Duration 
Mean Median Min Max    Mean Median Min Max 
Jan 
2007-
May 
2007 71.38 55.78 30.17 302.45 0.00 
 
131 
 
41.64 
 
70.29 
47.59 20.23 0.07 345.85 
June 
2007-
Jan 
2009 78.81 52.95 -35.05 698.36 0.25 
 
814 
 
79.85 
 
75.26 
32.65 12.58 0.02 799.13 
Feb 
2009-
Dec 
2009 69.92 51.53 23.14 856.41 0.00 
 
380 
 
45.35 
 
37.42 
24.18 12.56 0.02 319.07 
 
 
Table 6: CFD Type 2 Results (By Period) 
Period 
Returns (Basis Points) 
Percentage 
of Trades 
Losses 
No. of 
trades 
Std Dev 
Returns 
Std Dev 
of trade 
duration Trade Duration 
Mean Median Min Max    Mean Median Min Max 
Jan 
2007-
May 
2007 8.79 -5.92 -34.24 360.28 58.74 
 
143 
 
42.51 
 
48.65 
27.21 6.80 0.02 268.12 
June 
2007-
Jan 
2009 11.98 -10.55 
-
199.94 706.37 
65.21 
 
1009 
 
77.37 
 
56.40 
19.24 5.90 0.02 768.98 
Feb 
2009-
Dec 
2009 1.80 -10.57 -66.52 269.42 
65.80 
 
538 
 
44.08 
 
26.27 
11.87 4.83 0.02 310.32 
 
  
 
Table 7:  Retail Trader Results (Overall) 
Trade 
Type 
Returns (Basis Points) 
Percentage 
of Trades 
Losses 
No. of 
trades 
Std Dev 
Returns 
Std Dev 
of trade 
duration Trade Duration 
Mean Median Min Max    Mean Median Min Max 
1 
54.36 27.64 -295.47 791.71 3.30 817 79.95 71.74 35.38 12.97 0.02 799.13 
2 
-9.49 -34.40 -90.34 563.74 76.94 719 76.70 60.76 25.08 6.65 0.02 736.47 
Avg 
22.43 -3.38 -192.91 677.73 40.12 768 78.33 66.25 30.23 9.81 0.02 767.80 
 
 
Table 8: Retail Trader Type 1 Results (By Period) 
Period 
Returns (Basis Points) 
Percentage 
of Trades 
Losses 
No. of 
trades 
Std Dev 
Returns 
Std Dev 
of trade 
duration Trade Duration 
Mean Median Min Max    Mean Median Min Max 
Jan 
2007 -
May 
2007 47.88 28.53 5.11 326.06 0.00 
89 53.15 77.67 
50.40 19.50 0.07 345.85 
June20
07-Jan 
2009 57.72 28.17 -295.47 647.14 4.41 
499 87.27 81.06 
37.97 12.97 0.02 799.13 
Feb 
2009 -
Dec 
2009 49.55 27.01 -24.71 791.71 1.75 
229 71.20 38.54 
23.90 12.45 0.02 284.75 
 
 
Table 9: Retail Trader Type 2 Results (By Period) 
Period 
Returns (Basis Points) 
Percentage 
of Trades 
Losses 
No. of 
trades 
Std Dev 
Returns 
Std Dev 
of trade 
duration Trade Duration 
Mean Median Min Max    Mean Median Min Max 
Jan 
2007-
May 
2007 -17.70 -34.34 -64.85 295.58 82.26 
62 51.10 53.86 
34.12 7.50 0.02 268.12 
June  
2007-
Jan 
2009 -4.79 -35.87 -90.34 563.74 
75.78 
450 88.91 70.26 
27.09 6.73 0.02 736.47 
Feb 
2009-
Dec 
2009 -17.26 -32.74 -87.57 204.72 
77.78 
207 48.44 33.90 
17.99 6.38 0.02 290.53 
 
  
 
Table 10: All Traders Results (Overall) 
Trade 
Type 
Returns (Basis Points) 
Percentage 
of Trades 
Losses 
No. of 
trades 
Std Dev 
Returns 
Std Dev 
of trade 
duration Trade Duration 
Mean Median Min Max    Mean Median Min Max 
1 67.51 
47.42 -295.47 856.41 
1.02 
3233 75.56 68.86 
33.23 
12.88 0.02 799.13 
2 3.29 
-14.21 -223.14 706.37 
68.32 
3561 69.25 53.20 
20.27 
6.22 0.02 768.98 
 
 
Table 11: All Traders Type 1 Results (By Period) 
Period 
Returns (Basis Points) 
Percentage 
of Trades 
Losses 
No. of 
trades 
Std Dev 
Returns 
Std Dev 
of trade 
duration Trade Duration 
Mean Median Min Max    Mean Median Min Max 
Jan 
2007-
May 
2007 62.42 
51.32 5.11 326.05 
0.00 
328 46.19 73.68 
49.02 
19.68 0.07 345.85 
June 
2007-
Jan 
2009 
70.74 47.31 -295.47 698.36 1.46 
1985 83.41 77.96 
34.81 12.80 0.02 799.13 
Feb 
2009-
Dec 
2009 
62.32 46.51 -24.71 856.41 0.43 
920 65.14 38.04 
24.17 12.62 0.02 319.07 
 
 
Table 12: All Traders  Type 2 Results (By Period) 
Period 
Returns (Basis Points) 
Percentage 
of Trades 
Losses 
No. of 
trades 
Std Dev 
Returns 
Std Dev 
of trade 
duration Trade Duration 
Mean Median Min Max    Mean Median Min Max 
Jan 
2007-
May  
2007 1.60 
-9.56 -64.85 360.28 
63.04 
303 47.02 52 
30.21 
7.30 0.02 268.12 
June 
2007-
Jan 
2009 
6.58 -14.41 -223.14 706.37 69.12 
2173 80.35 61.63 
21.92 6.27 0.02 768.98 
Feb 
2009-
Dec 
2009 
-2.83 -14.92 -87.57 269.42 68.20 
1085 46.23 29.31 
14.20 5.85 0.02 310.32 
 
  
Table 13: All Traders Results By Firms 
Firm Trade 
type 
Returns (Basis Points) Percentage 
Trades 
Losses 
Trade Duration 
 Mean Median Min Max Mean Median Min Max 
BARC/BCS 1 66.36 47.36 -56.55 457.08 2.08  19.21 6.73 0.02 345.85 
BARC/BCS 2 15.63 -11.16 -79.49 628.44 65.38  12.93 6.45 0.02 337.37 
BATS/BTI 1 59.11 45.13 -3.89 288.15 0.62  53.84 26.38 0.05 611.65 
BATS/BTI 2 17.16 -14.95 -71.96 476.47 70.91  40.98 7.38 0.02 768.98 
BLT/BBL 1 74.23 45.36 -8.19 689.72 1.19  46.51 19.79 0.03 722.77 
BLT/BBL 2 34.30 -7.82 -61.92 534.45 55.45  35.80 12.70 0.02 526.40 
BP/BP 1 58.03 43.03 -13.70 345.39 1.04  27.85 12.55 0.07 409.60 
BP/BP 2 4.40 -7.32 -48.54 349.56 58.13  17.24 6.35 0.02 319.05 
BT.A/BT 1 71.85 53.76 -0.70 326.40 0.89  16.62 6.40 0.02 118.25 
BT.A/BT 2 5.16 -13.26 -87.57 361.90 65.46  10.98 5.43 0.02 116.30 
CCL/CUK 1 58.92 46.32 -17.34 361.10 1.36  29.02 13.50 0.02 391.35 
CCL/CUK 2 -1.86 -18.62 -90.34 232.77 70.08  15.78 6.08 0.02 240.68 
DGE/DEO 1 52.72 42.92 -12.58 362.20 1.55  56.22 19.40 0.12 416.28 
DGE/DEO 2 1.24 -12.03 -52.70 228.79 65.12  40.90 16.43 0.03 364.03 
GSK/GSK 1 71.35 43.60 3.61 856.41 0.00  28.57 12.47 0.02 501.63 
GSK/GSK 2 11.67 -9.93 -58.69 673.65 70.00  20.29 6.35 0.02 469.17 
IHG/IHG 1 75.81 53.90 1.35 365.13 0.00  9.57 5.28 0.03 79.98 
IHG/IHG 2 -9.61 -26.00 -74.70 352.34 77.56  4.87 0.31 0.02 84.03 
NG/NGG 1 58.61 46.19 3.61 297.07 0.00  66.59 32.87 0.12 479.70 
NG/NGG 2 16.28 -6.43 -63.49 288.84 55.17  82.64 45.55 0.27 453.70 
PSON/PSO 1 75.34 51.61 -0.62 689.50 0.58  36.81 13.55 0.05 292.12 
PSON/PSO 2 2.39 -16.55 -86.33 491.48 67.44  15.01 5.55 0.02 261.40 
RDSA/RDS 1 69.67 43.32 0.31 518.72 0.00  53.46 13.18 0.07 799.13 
RDSA/RDS 2 -15.67 -17.99 -60.03 55.90 80.51  44.37 6.85 0.02 690.37 
RDSB/RDS 1 56.89 48.06 -3.17 254.81 0.54  49.18 19.62 0.15 485.95 
RDSB/RDS 2 -5.41 -16.53 -58.30 194.05 70.47  32.13 12.82 0.02 279.50 
SHP/SHPG 1 65.18 43.76 -45.29 688.64 3.87  42.70 12.98 0.15 443.22 
SHP/SHPG 2 -13.37 -17.47 -223.14 126.19 76.71  16.80 6.75 0.02 310.32 
SN/SNN 1 61.01 50.64 -295.47 352.00 1.03  26.92 19.52 0.12 117.38 
SN/SNN 2 7.56 -14.26 -76.52 706.37 65.91  25.22 12.90 0.03 118.12 
 
 
Table 13 (continued): All Traders Results By Firms 
Firm Trade 
type 
Returns (Basis Points) Percentage 
Trades 
Losses 
Trade Duration 
 Mean Median Min Max Mean Median Min Max 
ULVR/UL 1 68.25 47.22 0.47 574.58 0.00  29.18 12.99 0.10 273.30 
ULVR/UL 2 -9.23 -12.55 -54.15 126.14 76.28  21.89 6.44 0.02 240.48 
WPP/WPPG 1 95.89 56.59 -8.31 698.36 1.09  22.64 6.59 0.05 643.67 
WPP/WPPG 2 -4.24 -17.86 -86.12 246.86 68.84  12.60 5.93 0.02 162.38 
 
 
Table 14: Institutional Trader Results (Overall) with Zero Stamp Duty 
Trade 
Type 
Returns (Basis Points) 
Percentage 
of Trades 
Losses 
No. of 
trades 
Std Dev 
Returns 
Std Dev 
of trade 
duration Trade Duration 
Mean Median Min Max    Mean Median Min Max 
1 
81.05 62.33 -20.99 883.21 0.06 1736 67.29 62.44 29.01 12.18 0.02 799.13 
2 
5.05 -5.49 -173.14 719.23 65.73 4100 51.86 35.94 9.46 0.13 0.02 768.98 
Avg 
43.05 28.42 -97.07 801.22 32.9 2918 59.56 49.19 19.24 6.16 0.02 784.06 
 
 
Table 15: Retail Trader Results (Overall) with Zero Stamp Duty 
Trade 
Type 
Returns (Basis Points) 
Percentage 
of Trades 
Losses 
No. of 
trades 
Std Dev 
Returns 
Std Dev 
of trade 
duration Trade Duration 
Mean Median Min Max    Mean Median Min Max 
1 
69.78 47.85 -245.47 841.71 0.34 1176 74.05 67.87 32.63 12.83 0.02 799.13 
2 
5.84 -14.45 -214.64 613.74 66.34 1310 65.63 51.80 19.70 6.22 0.02 768.98 
Avg 
37.81 16.7 -230.06 727.73 33.34 1243 69.84 59.84 26.17 9.53 0.02 784.06 
 
 
5. Analysis  
In this section we discuss our results in section 4 of the stock-ADR trading, and analyse them. 
 
5.1 General results 
The results in section 4 give the stock-ADR trading results. The type 1 trades are  long 
in the underlying stock and short in the associated ADR, while type 2 trades are short in the 
underlying stock and long in the associated ADR.  The results are provided net of all trading 
and transaction costs deductions; the trade duration is reported in hours. The overall results 
cover the entire January 2007- December 2009 trading period, while other tables provide 
results during specific periods.  
In table 1 we observe that mean and median returns for institutional traders for the 
overall trading period are 35.65 bps and 13.93bps, respectively. The average minimum return 
is -238.56 bps and the maximum trade duration is on average 784.06 hours, and so these factors  
may deter arbitrageurs from undertaking stock-ADR pair trading. The returns are generally 
positive and so stock-ADR arbitrage is on aggregate profitable.  Additionally, in table 1 the 
mean and median trade durations on average are 27.36 hours and 9.6 hours, respectively. This 
suggests the market is operating quite efficiently as arbitrage opportunities are eliminated 
quickly to prevent them existing for large durations. Such results are consistent for large market 
capitalisation stocks with high liquidity. 
The results of table 1 being generally positive and of short duration are not unexpected 
for a generally efficient market, if we consider the Impossibility Theorem of Grossman and 
Stiglitz  (see (Grossman and Stiglitz 1976,1980)). In other words, in order to effect correction 
of prices through arbitrage, arbitrageurs require riskless profits which are obtained by 
correcting mispricing. Consequently, mispricings must exist in markets to incentivise 
arbitrageurs to correct such mispricings. 
Whilst the aggregate stock-ADR pair trade returns are favourable, if we investigate the 
returns more closely we find that the type of trade has a significant impact on the profitability 
of the trades. In table 1 the percentage of trades with losses is 0.55%  for type 1 trades, whereas 
for type 2 this is 68.08%. In trade type 1 the mean and median returns are 67.62 and 45.65 bps, 
respectively, whereas in trade type 2 they are 3.68 and -17.79 bps, respectively. In type 1 the 
maximum return is 833.21 bps and the minimum is -253.97 bps, with a mean of 67.62 bps, 
therefore the maximum return can be more than 10 time greater than the mean whilst loss can 
be almost 5 times greater than the mean. However, for type 2 trades the maximum return is 
605.24 bps and the minimum is -223.14 bps, with a mean of 3.68 bps, therefore the maximum 
return can be almost 200 time greater than the mean whilst loss can be more than 60 times 
greater than the mean. 
A frequently cited explanation for the variation in pair trade returns is noise trader risk. 
As (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) and (De Long et al., 1990) explain, noisy traders trade without 
regard to fundamental information, consequently asset prices can diverge from arbitrage 
bounded prices (even in convergence pair trades). Moreover, hypothetically riskless arbitrage 
trades can cause asset prices to diverge such that it can cause traders to exit the position to meet 
liquidity constraints. However,  noise trader risk would not account for differences in the 
percentage loss of trades in trade types 1 and 2, because noise traders would trade without 
regard to fundamental information. Hence the noise trader’s impact on type 1 and 2 trades 
should not significantly differ. 
 Another potential explanation for the wide variation in pair trade returns has been 
explained by the availability of alternative trading opportunities. Abreu and Brunnermeier 
(Abreu and Brunnermeier, 2002) mention that existing arbitrage opportunities may not be fully 
exploited because traders exit the position prematurely (including at a loss) if a more profitable 
trade becomes available. This is essentially a capital constraint causing traders to choose 
between alternative arbitrage opportunities. However, the capital constraints for type 1 and 2 
trades are identical for the trader, hence this would not account for a significant difference in 
percentage trade losses. 
 The duration of type 1 and 2 trades in table 1 are not negligible.  In fact type 1 trades 
have mean and median durations that are approximately 33 and 13 hours, respectively, with a 
minimum time of 1 minute. Similarly, for type 2 trades the durations are shorter, with a mean 
and median duration approximately of  21 and 6 hours, respectively, both with a minimum time 
of 1 minute. Therefore type 1 trades take on average 50% longer than type 2 trades, also both 
trades last for hours (typically spanning more than 1 trading day), and so there is ample 
opportunity for arbitrageurs to spot, as well as take advantage of, arbitrage opportunities. 
 A natural question arises  as to why such arbitrage opportunities exist for such a long 
duration and how they may account for the stock-ADR returns. Abreu and Brunnermeier 
(Abreu and Brunnermeier, 2002) propose that arbitrageurs are susceptible to synchronisation 
risk, that is arbitrageurs cannot profit from arbitrage trades until other traders themselves 
engage in such trades to fully exploit the trade as well. Consequently, the delay or duration in 
arbitrage is dependent on the time required for all traders to converge on the trade and correct 
the mispricing. Whilst we would expect synchronisation risk to exist,  this would be common 
to both type 1 and 2 trades and so would not account for differences in trade duration between 
them. Moreover, synchronisation risk is essentially based on different traders becoming 
sequentially aware of price discrepancies. For our sample of highly liquid and large market 
capitalisation stocks, which are actively reported upon in the market, it is unlikely traders will 
face synchronisation risk when every trader is more likely to be aware of price discrepancies. 
Tuckman and Vila (Tuckman and Vila, 1992) propose that traders face a range of 
holding costs whenever they engage in any trade and play a key role in any trade. For example 
traders face holding costs such as earning no fee on margin deposits, and opportunity costs.  
Moreover, holding costs will increase with time (Tuckman and Vila, 1992), therefore pair 
trades requiring longer durations to converge to parity must necessarily require larger 
mispricings to compensate for larger holding costs (Tuckman and Vila, 1992). This would 
account for type 1 trades having large trade durations associated with larger returns compared 
to type 2. 
 
5.2 Market Microstructure In Stock-ADR Arbitrage  
A striking observation in table 1 is the difference between type 1 and 2 percentage trade 
losses: for type 1 it is 1.02% whereas for type 2 it is 68.32%.  The profitability of the stock-
ADR arbitrage trade is therefore directly related to the asset that is shorted, even after all trading 
costs are taken into account. The percentage trade losses results imply that stock-ADR arbitrage 
returns cannot be attributed to the previously discussed explanations. Firstly, noise trader risk 
should not differ on type 1 and 2 trades because noise traders would trade without regard to 
fundamental information,  hence their impact on type 1 and 2 trades should not differ.  
Secondly, holding costs cannot account for the differences as type 2 trades have a significantly 
lower trade duration than type 1 trades (50 to 100% on a mean and median duration basis, 
respectively).  As holding costs necessarily increase with time, type 1 trades should be therefore 
less profitable but are significantly more profitable. 
 All of the aforementioned arguments do not provide viable explanations for the results. 
We now turn to a more viable explanation of stock-ADR pair trading results based on market 
microstructure. Market microstructure is defined as the trading mechanisms used for financial 
securities, in terms of the moment to moment exchange or trading activities (Hasbrouk, 2007). 
Whilst we would expect in a perfectly efficient market that arbitrage trades can be executed for 
assets that are perfect substitutes for each other, in actual markets we rarely find perfect 
substitutes (that is we have market incompleteness). As it is known that ADRs have 
substantially different market microstructures to UK equities, this constitutes a source of 
imperfect substitution between the 2 assets. It is worth noting that prior to the widespread 
adoption of ETFs market microstructure was typically considered a negligible factor in 
markets. However, the impact of market microstructure is now considered a significant factor 
on markets. 
To understand the microstructure of ADRs we must understand the microstructure 
processes. To purchase an ADR one can obviously trade in the secondary ADR market, where 
one would buy an ADR from a seller as one would also trade in the secondary UK stock market. 
However, it is frequently not possible for ADRs to source ADR purchases from the secondary 
market. The most obvious method to obtain an ADR is to approach a depository bank running 
an ADR programme. To obtain ADRs from the bank it will firstly purchase the underlying 
shares from the UK stock market, deposit them in the bank for safe storage, and then issue new 
ADRs. This deposit is required as ADRs represent a claim on an actual share (either in 
fractional or multiple terms). Also the depository bank will charge a conversion fee for the 
stock-ADR conversion. (typically a fee of $0.05 per conversion) and a UK SDRT tax is levied 
at 1.50% (see Table 3). 
In addition to depository banks, ADR purchases can be sourced by a ‘crossbook swap’, 
and this is by far the more popular method than using depository banks. This is because the 
crossbook swap is significantly cheaper  because it does not attract the UK SRDT or the 
depository bank’s ADR conversion fee. The crossbook swap involves purchases the underlying 
stock on the UK stock market, and then exchanging it for an ADR by locating an ADR seller. 
A broker typically charges a fee for crossbook swaps, moreover the crossbook swap can be 
affected by liquidity issues as it requires locating traders wishing to swap stocks and ADRs.  
The shorting process for ADRs is also significantly different to UK equities (or any 
equity market) and we are required to short ADRs in type 1 trades. ADRs are shorted by ‘pre-
release’, whereby upon opening an ADR short position it is agreed that the bank facilitating 
the short must also purchase underlying stock in the ADR, when the ADR short position is 
closed. As ADRs represent a multiple number of shares, a multiple of the underlying shares 
must be purchased and stored in the depository bank. 
 A consequence of the ADR microstructure is that it impacts stock-ADR arbitrage pair 
trades. In type 1 trades we are long stocks and short ADRs; the ADR microstructure 
(specifically the ‘pre-release’ trading) means a multiple number of stocks must be purchased 
for each ADR that is shorted (since one ADR equals a multiple number of stocks).  It is also 
worth noting that (Chan et al., 2008) find results that imply ADR shorts cause stock purchases, 
since ADR premiums increase as the underlying home stock market’s liquidity decreases. 
 Although the depository bank is not forced to purchase the underlying stock until the 
ADR short position is closed under ‘pre-release’, the bank will be more incentivised to 
purchase the stock at its cheapest price rather than at any other time. The cheapest price should 
therefore coincide with the time the ADR short position is opened, rather than the time the 
ADR short position is closed. The net effect of the shorting ADR microstructure is that the type 
1 trade is effectively a net long position in the stock. As the stock is under-priced in a type 1 
trade (since it is cheaper than the ADR) this net long position in stocks means that this bias 
leads to stock being corrected towards the ADR price. In other words the bias works in favour 
of correcting the price discrepancy. 
We now examine type 2 trades, where we short stocks and we are long ADRs. In the 
UK short equity market (either from opening or closing positions) there is no direct relation on 
ADR transactions. Hence the UK shorting stock market microstructure is different to the ADR 
shorting market microstructure. As previously discussed, one can purchase ADRs from the 
secondary market to take a long position in ADRs, however this is frequently not possible, and 
utilising depository banks for ADR conversion is costly. Consequently, the preferred method 
of purchasing ADRs will be through crossbook swaps.  
A consequence of the crossbook swap transaction is that opening the long ADR position 
requires purchasing a multiple of the underlying stock. Therefore, the type 2 trade is no longer 
a direct opposite of the type 1 trade.  The ADR long position, which causes purchases of 
multiple underlying stocks, means that the stock’s price will be further increased. However, 
given that stocks are already over-priced (compared to ADRs) in a type 2 trade, increasing the 
price of stocks further will cause the stock’s price to diverge further away from the ADR (rather 
than converging). Moreover,  a greater divergence of the ADR’s price from the stock’s price 
creates a greater incentive to purchase ADRs, which leads to a perpetuating cycle of greater 
divergence in prices.  
To test the robustness of the crossbook swap transaction, that is the discrepancy in type 
1 and type 2 trades, we conduct pair trades by assuming zero SDRT. The results of the pair 
trades are reported in tables 14 and 15, where tables 14 and 15 are equivalent to tables 1 and 7, 
respectively, but with zero SDRT (we note that CFD trading does not incur any SDRT hence 
we do not produce a similar table for table 4). As can be observed in tables 14 and 15, the 
asymmetry in type 1 and 2 trades persists. In table 14 the type 1 has 0.06% percentage trade 
losses whereas type 2 has 65.73% percentage trade losses, similarly in table 15 the type 1 has 
0.34% percentage trade losses whereas type 2 has 66.34% percentage trade losses. Hence the 
asymmetry in pair trades exists regardless of SDRT tax. 
 The ADR market microstructure hypothesis is consistent with our empirical results. 
The type 1 returns are approximately 20 times greater than type 2 returns, on average. The 
market microstructure asymmetry in type 1 and 2 trades, causing differences in price 
convergence to parity between stocks and ADR, accounts for the significant difference in 
percentage trade losses. Additionally, the market microstructure hypothesis explains the higher 
median returns in type 1 and negative median returns for type 2 trades.  
 
 
5.3 CFD and Retail Traders 
To test the results are due to ADR market microstructure (rather than the stock’s 
microstructure) we examine ADR pair trades with CFD (contracts-for-difference). The CFD is 
a ‘derivative’ product that tracks the price of a stock, but most importantly CFDs do not directly 
impact the ADR microstructure. CFD traders pay no stamp duty tax and incur low brokerage 
commissions.  The largest retail provider of CFD trading facilities, Interactive Brokers, charges 
an all-inclusive commission of 5bps on UK stock CFDs, on top of the bid-ask spreads (the fee 
schedule is available at (www.interactivebrokers.com/en/p.php?f=commission)). The CFD 
investor benefits from the lowest overall transaction costs, since CFD positions are exempt 
from UK SDRT tax. A CFD investor may be a retail or proprietary trader but we make the 
conservative assumption that CFD traders pay retail CFD brokerage costs, based on the fee 
structure of Interactive Brokers. However, in reality, we would reasonably expect proprietary 
CFD traders to benefit from far lower costs than retail CFD traders. 
The CFD pair trade results are revealing. Whilst the CFD return and duration results 
differ in terms of mean, median etc. their results reflect a similar pattern seen with the 
institutional trader results. The most striking observation is that table 4 CFD results are similar 
to table 1 in terms of percentage of trade losses: for type 1 they are 0.55% and 0.23%, for type 
2 they are 68.08% and 64.87%, for stock and CFD results respectively. In table 5 the type 1 
CFD percentage trade losses vary from 0-0.25%, similarly in table 2 the type 1 results for stocks 
vary from 0-0.74%. Moreover for type 2 the percentage trade losses, in table 6 the CFD losses 
vary from 58-66%,  and similarly in table 3 for stocks it is 57-66%. The similarity in results, 
over different market conditions, implies the results must be due to the common factor: ADR 
microstructure. 
We now examine our retail trader results (we recall that our initial results were 
assuming institutional traders for stocks). Again, to test our initial results are due to ADR 
market microstructure (rather than the stock’s microstructure) we examine ADR pair trades 
with retail traders of stocks. Moreover,  market microstructure operations are typically sensitive 
to the trader type (for instance, it is well known that brokers will engage in short selling for 
professional traders but will deny the shorting orders to small investors (Evans et al., 2009)) 
we should also test whether our results are sensitive to trader type (net of trading costs). The 
retail investors pay SDRT, brokerage and exchange fees, in addition to bid-ask spreads.  
 The table 7 results provide the pair trade returns for retail investors, over the whole 
sample period.  As we would expect, the institutional trader is able to trade more profitably 
than retail investors. The results are given net of transaction costs, therefore one may expect 
no difference between the institutional and retail investors, however, the lower transaction costs 
mean that the institutional trader will have more opportunities for profitable pair trades. The 
table 7 results again confirm that it is the type 2 trades that lead to lower returns (on all 
measures).  This is also confirmed by tables 8 and 9, which test over different trading periods. 
Hence on all investor types the type 2 trades lead to lower returns and therefore supports the 
ADR microstructure hypothesis.  
 It is informative to examine the aggregate market performance, including all traders 
(institutional, retail and CFD), over the entire trading period and specific trading periods: these 
results are presented in tables 10-12. As one can see from the tables, both type 1 and 2 trades 
vary with market conditions in terms of returns and percentage trade losses. The  minimum and 
maximum returns varying with market conditions. Whilst the variations in median and mean 
returns are approximately similar for type 1 and 2 trades, the percentage trade losses vary 
significantly. For type 1, we do not see a significant variation in percentage trade losses in table 
11, ranging from 0-1.46%, however type 2 results change significantly in table 12 moving from 
63.04% to 69.12%.  
For robustness we also examined the pair trade results by each firm, the results are 
provided in table 13 and represent the results of table 10 on a firm and trade type basis; the first 
column provides the ticker symbols for the associated stocks and ADRs traded in the pair trade. 
As one can observe from table 13 the results on a firm basis also reflect the results on an 
aggregate basis. In particular, for type 1 trades we have a consistently low figure in percentage 
trade losses, ranging from 0-3.87%, whereas for type 2 trades we have a consistently high 
figure of percentage trade losses in the range 55.17-80.51%. Consequently, we can conclude 
that the variation in type 1 and type 2 results is not specific to any firm, and are consistently a 
trading based factor. 
The aggregate market results are consistent with the microstructure hypothesis because 
bear market conditions are known to impact trading liquidity. A microstructure hypothesis of 
our results would imply that type 1 and 2 trades should differ across different market 
conditions. For type 1 trades, in pre-release we do not need to short shares but buy them 
(although we are short ADR). Hence we would expect type 1 trades to be affected less by 
market conditions than type 2 trades. Although type 1 trades have one position heavily affected 
by bear market conditions (a short position in ADR), type 2 trades have both sides of the pair 
trade heavily affected by bear market conditions. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we present evidence that supports the findings of (Alsayed and McGroarty 
2012): using 1-minute interval, high frequency data on 19 UK companies, over a period of 3 
years we conduct the analysis on the longest duration dataset to date in the extant literature. 
This paper is the first to highlight that the stock-ADR arbitrage pair trading found by (Alsayed 
and McGroarty, 2012) is directly influenced by the market microstructure of ADRs.   Whilst 
long and short stocks can be easily sourced from the relevant markets, long and short ADR 
sourcing is less viable due to the market microstructure, but also, ADR’s microstructure 
directly impacts the stock’s price.   
Our results have implications for ADR markets, as well as market microstructures upon 
financial innovations such as exchange traded funds. We also test our  microstructure 
hypothesis further for robustness, with respect to specific investor types (CFD, institutional 
and retail  traders), as well as during different market conditions (before, during and after the 
commencement of the global financial crisis). We  find our results are consistent with our ADR  
microstructure hypothesis.  
In terms of future work we would like to extend our analysis to emerging markets,  
where markets pose distinctly different trading issues compared to developed markets. The 
factors such as institutional ownership, and restrictions on foreign ownership pose unique 
conditions on arbitrage opportunities. Another area of future work is to examine the impact of 
interest rates, since interest rates affect short selling costs and exchange rates, hence interest 
rates would affect pair trading returns. 
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